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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CHRISTIAN C.F. LEE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20000775-O 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the continued seizure of Lee and the warrantless search of Lee's vehicle 
was justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
§ 14 of the Utah Constitution? 
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court's factual findings 
are reviewed for clear error while its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990). Likewise, the trial court's 
ultimate decision that the consent was voluntary or involuntary is also reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). 
This issue was preserved in a motion to suppress and a suppression hearing (R. 18-
19; 48-58; 84). 
1 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
American Fork City appeals from the order of dismissal and order of suppression 
of the Honorable Howard H. Maetani, Fourth District Court, American Fork Department. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Christian Lee was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court, American 
Fork Department, on or about November 12, 1999, with Driving under the Influence of 
Alcohol, a class B misdemeanor; Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class B 
misdemeanor; and Possession of Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 4-5). 
On January 3, 2000, Lee filed a Motion to Suppress requesting the suppression of 
evidence on grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 18-19; 48-58). 
On March 31, 2000, a suppression hearing was held before the Honorable Howard H. 
Maetani (R. 84). After the submission of proposed findings and conclusions, Judge 
Maetani granted Lee's ordered the suppressio of the evidence and the dismissal of the 
charges against him (R. 60-66; 71). 
On September 1, 2000, American Fork City filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth 
District Court (R. 77). 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On November 5, 1999, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Officer Cory Smith of the 
American Fork Police Department, conducted a traffic stop on a dark colored truck for 
speeding and running a stop sign (R. 84 at 3-5). Smith approached the driver of the 
vehicle, who was identified as Christian Lee by a Utah driver's license (R. 84 at 6). 
Smith also observed a bluejacket sitting on the back of the truck which had the words 
"POLICE" written in white/yellow letters on the back of it (R. 84 at 6-7). 
Smith then returned to his vehicle and wrote a traffic citation (R. 84 at 6). Another 
officer arrived on the scene (R. 84 at 7). Smith finished the citation and again 
approached Lee (R. 84 at 7). According to Smith, he had Lee sign the citation and gave it 
to him along with his driver's license (R. 84 at 7, 23).l According to Lee, Smith had him 
sign the citation but never gave it or his driver's license back to him (R. 84 at 25). 
Although Smith (or any other officer to his knowledge) had received no reports or 
complaints of any attempts by anyone of impersonation of a police officer prior to the 
stop of Lee's vehicle (R. 84 at 16), and although Smith never observed Lee do anything 
with the jacket which would give him reason to believe that he was going to impersonate 
a police officer (R. 84 at 17), Smith questioned Lee about the jacket (R. 84 at 7, 15-16). 
Lee informed Smith that the jacket came from a friend and that neither he nor the friend 
were police officers (R. 84 at 7). Smith asked if Lee had any other police paraphernalia 
and Lee responded in the negative (R. 84 at 8). Smith then asked for consent to search 
the vehicle and Lee consented (and told Smith that he could take the jacket if he desired) 
(R. 84 at 8). 
^mith initially, however, testified on cross-examination that he was in possession of 
both the citation and Lee's drivers license when he questioned Lee about the jacket (R. 84 
at 16). 
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Smith had Lee step out of the vehicle (R. 84 at 8). Smith then reached into the 
vehicle and removed the jacket; and as he did so, he smelled the odor of marijuana from 
inside the vehicle (R. 84 at 8). Smith then retrieved his K-9 for a more detailed search of 
the vehicle and the dog found marijuana and paraphernalia in the middle console of the 
truck (R. 84 at 9-10). While Smith searched the vehicle, Lee stood outside over on a 
grassy area by Smith's vehicle with Officer Holland (R. 84 at 8). 
Smith then placed Lee under arrest (R. 84 at 11). As he did so, Smith noticed an 
odor of alcohol on Lee (R. 84 at 11). Smith and Holland performed field sobriety tests on 
Lee which showed impairment (R. 84 at 11-12). Smith observed no impairment by Lee 
nor noticed any odors emanating from the vehicle prior to the search of the truck (R. 84 at 
21). Lee was charged with driving under the influence, possession of marijuana and 
possession of paraphernalia, all class B misdemeanors. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Lee asserts that the trial court correctly concluded that the warrantless search of 
his vehicle constituted an illegal and unjustifiable search under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution. Specifically, 
Lee asserts the following: One, that the trial court correctly concluded that the continued 
detention of Lee while he was asked questions about the jacket and to consent to the 
search of his truck exceeded the scope of any permissible detention and was unsupported 
by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that was independent of the initial detainer. 
Two, that Lee's consent to the search of his truck was not attenuated from the illegal 
detention. Three, that the warrantless search of Lee's truck was not justified under an 
"officer safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment's protections. Finally, Lee asserts 
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that the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion that there was a Fourth Amendment 
violation which required suppression of all evidence obtained from the continued 
detention of Lee and the search of his truck is correct and that the subsequent dismissal of 
the charges against him based on the suppression of the evidence should be affirmed by 
this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF LEE'S VEHICLE CONSTITUTED 
AN ILLEGAL SEARCH THAT CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED 
UNDER AN EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S 
PROHIBITION AGAINST SUCH SEARCHES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the 
Utah Constitution guarantee individuals the right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. "Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' 
within the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments....55 State v. Case, 884 
P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 
S.Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979)). While an individual has "a lesser expectation of privacy in a 
car than in his or her home, one does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
while in a vehicle.55 State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). Nevertheless, 
it is this lessor expectation of privacy that has resulted in an "automobile exception55 to 
the warrant rule which allows officers the ability to "temporarily detain a vehicle and its 
occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the purposes of conducting a 
limited investigation of the suspicion.55 State v. James, 2000 UT 80 at 1[10, 13 P.3d 576. 
In reviewing the legality of a traffic stop this Court must consider two questions: 
"[W]hether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was 
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reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place." State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed. 889 (1968)). The inquiry as to the 
first question focuses on whether the stop was "incident to a traffic violation committed 
in the officer's presence." State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1991). Lee 
concedes that Smith was constitutionally justified in initiating stopping his vehicle for 
investigation of speeding and running a stop sign. 
The focus of the second question is "whether the stop was reasonably related in 
scope to the traffic violation which justified it in the first place." State v. Hansen, 2000 
UT App 353 at Tfll, 17 P.3d 1135, cert granted, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001) (citing 
Patefield, 927 P.2d at 657). "Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). In addition both the 
"length and scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to amd justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 
763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1868). Lee asserts that the 
American Fork police exceeded the permissible scope of the detention and that the trial 
court was correct in its conclusion that all evidence obtained as a result of the search of 
Lee's truck must be suppressed because they were obtained by an unlawful detention 
unsupported by reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. 
A. The police lacked reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity and 
exceeded the scope of any permissible detainer. 
Once, the purpose of the initial stop was effectuated, the police were obligated to 
release Lee from his detention and allow him "to proceed on his way, without being 
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subject to further delay by police for additional questioning." State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). Moreover, any "[i]nvestigative 
questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of 
more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, 
articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer[s] at the 
time of the stop." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. 
Lee asserts that the trial court was correct in its conclusion that the purpose of the 
initial stop was effectuated when he signed and received the citation for the traffic 
offenses; and that he should have been allowed "to proceed on his way without being 
subject to further delay" by the officers for additional investigative questioning. 
Accordingly, because Lee continued to be seized by the officers, any additional 
questioning by the officers subjected him to further delay and had to be supported by 
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Lee asserts that the trial court 
correctly concluded that Officer Smith lacked reasonable suspicion that Lee was engaging 
in other, more serious criminal activity, based on the totality of the circumstances. 
Specifically, Lee asserts that the trial court correctly concluded that "[I]t is not a crime to 
have possession of a jacket with the word "POLICE" on it. Nor does possession of such 
a jacket mean that a crime is about to be committed" (Findings of Fact & Conclusions of 
Law at 3, f 3). 
One, there was no evidence or reports that Lee (or anyone else in the area) was 
engaging in, or attempting to engage in, the crime of impersonating an officer (R. 84 at 
16). Two, Officer Smith testified that he did not observe Lee do anything with the jacket 
which would give him reason to believe that he was actually intending to impersonate a 
police officer (R. 84 at 17). 
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Three, the crime of impersonating a police officer requires more than mere 
possession of a jacket with the words "POLICE" written on it. For a conviction under 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-15(3) one must impersonate a peace officer with intent to 
deceive or induce; falsely state that one is a peace officer with intent to deceive or induce; 
or possess or display police paraphernalia with the intent to deceive or induce another to 
submit to his pretended authority. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in its 
conclusion that without evidence of actual impersonation, or possession of police 
paraphernalia with intent to deceive or induce another to submit or rely on his pretend 
authority, any suspicion of criminal activity was not reasonable (Findings of Fact & 
Conclusions of Law at 4, f4). 
If this Court concludes that the trial court erred and the police only need evidence 
which could possibly establish one element of a multi-element statute in order to have 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, then police would have virtually 
unbridled discretion to stop, further detain, or even search, individuals where it is very 
likely that no criminal activity has been, or is being, engaged in. For example, if an 
officer observed an individual walk into a department store, select a garment, and proceed 
to a dressing room where the garment is placed on the individual, does the officer then 
possess a reasonable, articulable suspicion of retail theft sufficient to justify the stop or 
continued detention of that individual for investigative questioning? Retail theft, like 
impersonation of a peace officer, is a multi-element statute and one essential element is 
that a person "takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers, or causes to be 
transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment." Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-602. 
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Another example is possession of a firearm in a vehicle. In State v. Chapman, 921 
P.2d 446 (Utah 1996), the Supreme Court found that mere possession of a firearm in a 
vehicle does not allow an officer, with no other evidence available, to continue to detain 
an individual for questioning-or to run a computer check on the gun to determine if it is 
stolen-simply because one of the elements of the crime of possession of a stolen firearm 
is met by the discovery of a firearm in the individual's vehicle. 
Accordingly, Lee asks that this Court find that the trial court correctly concluded 
that the officers exceeded the scope of any permissible detainer when they continued to 
detain and question Lee without reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity once the 
purpose of the initial stop was effectuated. In addition, the evidence produced before the 
trial court establishes that other than the presence of the "POLICE" jacket, the officers 
had no suspicions of any other criminal activity at the time Lee was impermissibly 
detained. Neither Officer Smith nor Holland had any suspicions that Lee was operating a 
vehicle while impaired or that he was in possession of marijuana: It was not until after 
Smith questioned Lee about the jacket and reached into the truck to retrieve the jacket 
that he had any suspicion of other criminal activity R. 84 at 8-10, 21). Therefore, the trial 
court correctly ruled that all evidence was obtained as a result of this continued illegal 
seizure and must be suppressed. 
B, Lee's consent to the search of his vehicle was obtained by police exploitation of 
a prior illegality. 
A warrantless search is only permissible under the Fourth Amendment if the State 
can establish that it falls within one of the "few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (citation 
omitted). One of said established exceptions is consent. Id. However, "[A] defendant's 
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consent to search following illegal police activity is valid under the Fourth Amendment 
only if both of the following tests are met: (i) The consent was given voluntarily, and (ii) 
the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." Hansen, 2000 
UT App 353 at ^ 18 (quoting Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262). Lee asserts that his consent to 
the search of his bag was obtained by Officer Smith's "exploitation of a prior illegality." 
State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 4335 440 (Utah App. 1996). 
Lee asserts that any consent he gave to the search of his truck is not 
constitutionally valid because it was obtained through police exploitation of prior 
misconduct. Lee has already established that the trial court correctly concluded that his 
continued detention once he was cited for the initial traffic violations exceeded the scope 
of any constitutionally permissible detainer because it was unsupported by reasonable 
suspicion of other criminal activity. "If voluntary consent follows police misconduct, the 
[City] must establish 'the existence of intervening factors which prove that the consent 
was sufficiently attenuated from the police misconduct. Ham, 910 P.2d at 440. 
Factors this Court must examine in regards to this issue are: One, the temporal 
proximity of the initial illegality and the consent in question. Two, the presence of 
intervening circumstances. Three, the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal misconduct. 
Ham, 910 P.2d at 440 (citations ommitted). Lee asserts that all of these factors weigh 
against attenuation in this case. 
One, the proximity between the illegal detention after he had been cited for the 
traffic violations and his consent to search is very short. Almost contemporaneous to the 
time Lee was given the citation and should have been free to leave, Smith continued his 
detention of Lee and engaged in investigative questioning-which included a request to 
search his truck (R. 84 at 7-8, 15-16). 
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Two, like the facts in Ham, there were "absolutely no intervening" circumstances 
between the illegal detention and the consent. 910 P.2d at 441. 
Three, Lee asserts that the purpose of the continued illegal detention—and the 
purpose of Smith's desire to search the bag—was an obvious attempt to find evidence that 
Lee was involved in other criminal activity without any reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause. 
Based upon these facts, Lee asks that this Court conclude that his consent was not 
attenuated from the illegal detention and Officer Smith's misconduct and that it cannot be 
used by the City to validate the warrantless search of Lee's truck. 
C. The continued detention of Lee and the subsequent search of his vehicle cannot 
be justified under an "officer safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment. 
In its brief the City alludes to the notion that the police were justified in their 
continued detention of Lee because the presence of the "POLICE" jacket created a safety 
concern for the officer because the presence of the jacket could signal the presence of a 
weapon (Br. of Appellant at 14). However, the City did not raise this issue in the trial 
court and has therefore, waived the issue on appeal. 
Nonetheless, Lee asserts that the continued detention of him, and the subsequent 
search of his vehicle, cannot be justified under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to an 
"officer safety" exception. Under the holding in Terry v. Ohio, and its progeny, a frisk or 
search for weapons for officer safety following an investigatory stop is constitutionally 
permissible if: One, a police officer observes unusual conduct which is interpreted in 
light of his experience as an indication of possible criminal activity and present danger; 
and two, there is nothing in the initial stages of the encounter which serves to dispel the 
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officer's reasonable fear for his own or other's safety. State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 660 
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884). 
Lee asserts that Smith's continued seizure of him and the warrantless search of his 
truck was not supported by "reasonable and articulable suspicion" that he was presently 
dangerous or that there were weapons present. State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132, 1135, 
1137-38 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, the search of his bag was not justified as under the 
"officer safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against warrantless 
searches. 
One, "nothing about the nature of the underlying offense being investigated 
prompted a conern for safety... [and] nothing [Lee] did, by way of conduct, attitude or 
gesture, suggested the presence of a weapon." State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 454 
(Utah 1996) (quoting Orme, J. dissenting in Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 732 (Utah App. 
1992)). The underlying offenses consisted of two benign traffic violations. In addition, 
the evidence established nothing about Lee's demeanor or conduct which suggested the 
presence of a weapon. 
Three, if Smith really feared for his safety because of the mere presence of the 
"POLICE" jacket, he would have immediately questioned Lee about the jacket at and the 
presence of weapons at the beginning of the traffic stop, or would have immediately had 
Lee exit the car and conducted a Terry frisk. Instead, Smith noticed the jacket, gathered 
identification from Lee, and returned to his vehicle to prepare a citation without doing 
anything about the presence of the jacket. 
Accordinlgy, Smith's continued seizure of Lee and the warrantless search of his 
truck was not supported by "reasonable and articulable suspicion" that he was presently 
dangerous or that there were weapons present; and therefore, the search and seizure 
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cannot be justified under an "officer safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment. 
Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1135, 1137-38. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Lee asks that this Court affirm the decision of the trial 
court suppressing the evidence and dismissing the charges against him because the 
American Fork police exceeded the scope of their permissible seizure of Lee without 
reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. Lee also asks that this court conclude that 
any consent by Lee to the search of his vehicle was not attenuated from the misconduct of 
the police; and that the mere presence of a "POLICE" jacket does not justify the 
continued seizure of Lee and the search of his vehicle based on an "officer safety" 
exception to the Fourth Amendment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jjfc day of August, 2001. 
MargarerP. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellee to James "Tucker" Hansen, American Fork City Attorney, 306 West 
Main Stree, American Fork, Utah 84003 this (LL day of August, 2001. 
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PATRICK V. LINDSAY (#8309) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
43 East 200 North 
PCI Box',,L,r 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 
Telephone: 373-4912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MUNICIPAL DIVISION - AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTIAN C.F. LEE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Civil No. 995101222 
Judge: Howard H. Maetani 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court, 
having received and reviewed the Motion, including memorandum in support, memorandum in 
opposition, and having reviewed the applicable law, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that on November 5, 1999 at approximately 9:30 p.m., Officer Cory 
Smith of the American Fork Police Department was on patrol in the vicinity of 300 North 
100 West in American Fork City. 
2. The Court finds that Officer Smith observed a dark colored truck turn left and travel West 
on 300 North. Officer Smith observed the truck fail to stop at the stop sign located at the 
intersection of 100 West 300 North. Officer Smith then observed the vehicle accelerate 
to about 50 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone and obtained a radar reading of 50 
miles per hour. 
The Court finds that based on these observations, Officer Smith stopped the vehicle an 
approached it. 
The Court finds that as he approached the vehicle, Officer Smith observed a blue jack* 
on the driver's seat that had the words "POLICE" written in white letters on the back c 
it. 
The Court finds that Officer Smith identified the driver as the Defendant, Christian C.1 
Lee and proceeded to cite him for speeding. 
The Court finds that after writing the speeding ticket and handing it to the Defendant, bi 
before returning the Defendant's license to 'him, Officer Smith asked Defendant about tl 
jacket with the police lettering, and asked if Defendant was a police officer. 
The Court finds that the Defendant replied that he was not, that he had received the jack 
from a friend who was also not a police officer. 
The Court finds that Officer Smith then asked the Defendant why he had the jacket, ai 
Defendant replied that he did not know. 
The Court finds that Officer Smith then, without observing anything else that cou 
suggest an unlawful reason or motive for possessing the jacket, including no reports tt 
Defendant or others in the recent past has been involved with impersonating a poli 
officer, proceeded to ask Defendant if there was anything else in the vehicle, a 
Defendant replied no. 
The Court finds that Officer Smith then asked Defendant for permission to search t 
vehicle which the Defendant gave. 
The Court finds that as Officer Smith removed the jacket from the vehicle, he smelled 1 
odor of marijuana. 
2 
1 12. The Court finds that a subsequent K-9 search of the vehicle revealed what the officer 
2 believed to be marijuana and paraphernalia. 
3 I From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the following 
4 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
5 1. It is well established law in the State of Utah that: "(1) an officer may approach a citizen 
6 at any time and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) 
7 an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person 
8 ha committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be temporary 
9 and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer 
10 may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been 
11 committed or is being committed." State v. Deitman. 739 P.2nd 616 (Utah 1987). 
12 2. Officer Smith seized the Defendant when he pulled the Defendant over for a speeding 
13 violation. Initially the stop was clearly justified and classified as a level-two detention. 
14 3. The prosecution argues that when the officer saw the "POLICE" jacket located in the 
15 Defendant's vehicle that it gave the officer reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant and 
16 investigate further for possible crime. The court disagrees, for the officer's suspicion 
17 must be reasonable. It is not a crime to have possession of a jacket with the work 
18 "POLICE" on it. Nor does the possession of such jacket mean that a crime is about to 
19 be committed. There was not evidence or reports of the Defendant or anyone else in the 
20 area engaging or attempting to engage in the crime of impersonating an officer. Once the 
21 stop was made, the detention should have been temporary and should have lasted no 
22 longer than was necessary to effectuate the stop. "If there is investigating questioning 
23 | that detains the driver beyond the scope of the initial stop, it must be supported by 
24 
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reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means 
suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances 
facing the officer at the time of the stop." State v. Lopez. 873 P2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 
1994). 
4. Furthermore, to be guilty of the crime of impersonating an officer the person not onlj 
needs to display or possess articles or objects associated with the police, but he must hav« 
the intent to deceive another person or to induce another to submit to or rely on hi; 
pretended authority. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-8-512(3). Officer Smith did nothing mon 
than see the jacket in question. There was no evidence of intent, which is essential for th< 
crime in question to be committed or about to be committed. Therefore, the officer die 
not have reasonable articulable suspicion to investigate the Defendant any further than fo 
purpose of the initial traffic violation. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters the following 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Defendant's Motion t< 
Suppress is hereby granted. 
DATED this J(^~ day of August, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
)WARD H^MAETANT 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
SCOTT WILLIAMS 
American Fork City Attorney 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPT. 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
Plaintiffs), 
vs. 
CHRISTIAN C.F. LEE, 
Defendant(s). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 995101222 
DATE:7 JULY 11, '2000 
JUDGE HOWARD H. MAETANI 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. The Court, having received and reviewed the motion, including memorandum 
in support, memorandum in opposition, and having reviewed the applicable law, now 
makes the following findings and conclusions: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court adopts the Defendant's Findings of Fact. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
2. It is well established law in the state of Utah that: "(1) an officer may approach a 
citizen at any time and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his 
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to 
believe an offense has been committed or is being committed." State v. Deitman. 739 
P.2d 616 (Utah 1987). 
3. Officer Smith seized the defendant when he pulled the defendant over for a speeding 
violation. Initially the stop was clearly justified and classified as a level-two 
detention. 
4. The prosecution argues that when the officer saw the "POLICE" jacket located in 
defendant's vehicle that it gave the officer reasonable suspicion to detain defendant 
and investigate further for possible crime. The Court disagrees, for the officer's 
suspicions must be reasonable. It is not a crime to have possession of a jacket with 
the word "POLICE" on it. Nor does the possession of such jacket mean that a crime 
is about to be committed. There was no evidence or reports of the defendant or 
anyone else in the area engaging or attempting to engage in the crime of 
impersonating an officer. Once the stop was made, the detention should have been 
temporary and should have lasted no longer than was necessary to effectuate the stop. 
"If there is investigative questioning that detains the driver beyond the scope of the 
initial stop, it must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts 
drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." 
State v. Lopez. 873 P2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). 
5. Furthermore, to be guilty of the crime of impersonating an officer the person not only 
needs to display or possess articles or objects associated with the police, but he must 
have the intent to deceive another person or to induce another to submit to or rely on 
his pretended authority. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-8-512(3). Officer Smith did nothing 
more than see the jacket in question. There was no evidence of intent, which is 
essential for the crime in question to be committed or about to be committed. 
Therefore, the officer did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to investigate the 
defendant any further than for purpose of the initial traffic violation. 
6. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's Motion to Suppress is granted. Counsel 
for the defendant to prepare an order consistent with this opinion, submit it to counsel 
for city approval as to form and to the Court to execution. 
Dated at American Fork, Utah this i±I_ day of July, 2000. 
